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SHIELD LAWS: THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
T HERE IS LrITLE QUESTION THAT the events surrounding the Water-
gate break-in have cast journalists, particularly investigative re-
porters, into the public spotlight. The "Deep Throat" informant of Wa-
tergate fame has indeed become legend. Despite the increasing
importance of the journalist in society, however, one controversy which
has long been of significant concern to reporters has yet to be resolved
- the compelled disclosure of journalistic sources in courtroom or grand
jury proceedings. Threatened with citation for contempt, the journalist
in such situations must often face two equally unacceptable alterna-
tives: divulge a confidential source, or go to jail.
To circumvent conflicts of this nature, the journalistic profession has
urged the adoption of an evidentiary privilege which would protect re-
porters from compelled disclosure of confidential sources. This Note
will focus on one means of instituting such a privilege - the shield law.
To provide a framework for the analysis of legislative efforts in this
area, however, the discussion must begin with an examination into the
scope and limitations of judicially-recognized concepts of journalistic
privilege.
I. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH
A. The Common Law
No privilege against source disclosure was recognized at common
law. The ground most often asserted in support of such a privilege was
injury to the journalist's career.' These arguments, however, were gen-
erally unsuccessful. The 1936 decision in People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff2 is the definitive statement on the question. In Mooney, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the law generally required the dis-
closure of all pertinent information by witnesses in order that justice
might be served. Non-disclosure privileges constituted exceptions to
this general rule, and made it more difficult to achieve just results. The
tendency, therefore, was to restrict privileges against non-disclosure.3
B. Constitutional Claims
Finding no relief at common law, newspersons began to base their
claims of privilege on the first amendment guarantees of freedom of the
I See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. T2, 70 S.E. 781 (1911). A reporter was called to
testify about information he had received from a police officer. The reporter asserted that if he
were to respond to this line of inquiry, he would be ruined as a professional journalist since he had
received the information under a promise of confidentiality. He claimed he would lose his
position with the Augusta Herald and would be unable to find employment elsewhere as a
reporter.
2 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (Ct. App. 1936).
See Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (newsperson required to
answer questions and disclose the sources if these questions were pertinent to the pro-
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press. 4 In Garland v. Torre,5 a journalist for the New York Herald Tri-
bune refused to divulge the source of an allegedly libelous story she had
written about Judy Garland, claiming that to do so would violate the
first amendment by placing an impermissible burden on the flow of
news to the public.6 The Second Circuit considered this premise and re-
jected it. The court held that the first amendment freedoms were not
absolute, and that whether they were to prevail depended upon the out-
come of a balancing test. This balance was to be struck between the
first amendment claim and "a paramount public interest in the fair
administration of justice." When the journalist's testimony was of
doubtful relevance or when the judicial process was being employed to
force a wholesale disclosure of news sources, the balance should be
struck in favor of the journalistic privilege. The Garland court adopted
the "heart of the claim test," holding that when the issue of the source's
identity was indispensible to the plaintiff's claim, the Constitution did
not give the witness a right to refuse to answer.8
Garland was the first of many cases which involved a balancing be-
tween the two conflicting premises of free press and the fair adminis-
tration of justice. These cases arose in three broad areas: criminal, civil,
and legislative proceedings. The application of the balancing test to
each of these areas has produced divergent results.
Criminal proceedings are governed by the sixth amendment guaran-
tee of fair trial.9 When a journalist asserts a testimonial privilege in the
context of such proceedings the conflict is one between the free flow of
information to the public and the fair and effective administration of
justice,10 and is necessarily resolved only upon examination of individ-
ual fact patterns on a case by case basis. The courts must weigh the
ceedings); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1951) (journalists enjoy no privilege of con-
fidential communication and are subject to general duty to testify).
' U.S. CoNsr. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom . . .of the press .. " This amendment has been applied to the
states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
5 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 549.
8 Id. at 550.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
This amendment was applied to the states in piecemeal fashion through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right
to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of opposing witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).




competing constitutional values, taking into account the surrounding
factors of societal benefit and detriment. The procedure of balancing
such fundamental values is always precarious because the question is
always a close one;" the courts have found a privilege in some cases,
and have declined to do so in others."
Journalists' claims of privilege in grand jury proceedings present a
different problem. To understand the problem fully, it is necessary to
examine briefly the functions of a grand jury.' 3  The Framers of the
Constitution incorporated the English common law concept of the grand
jury in the fifth amendment. 14  The function of a grand jury is investi-
gatory, not prosecutory, and does not involve the issue of guilt or inno-
cence. 5 The grand jury is mandated to determine only if there is prob-
able cause to formally charge an individual with a crime.' 6 Unlike a
trial, therefore, a grand jury investigation operates without sixth amend-
ment constraints,' 7 and the direct confrontation to the journalistic priv-
ilege presented by the sixth amendment is absent. What is present,
however, is the doctrine that "the public . . . has a right to every
man's evidence,""' which must be balanced against the journalist's first
amendment claim of privilege. The courts have held that every citizen
owes to the United States the duty of giving testimony, no matter how
onerous the burden or how great the sacrifice. 9 While there may be
" For an in-depth discussion, see Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial
Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111 (1960); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument
for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 18 (1969); Note, Reporters and
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L. J. 317
(1970); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591.
An interesting example of a direct confrontation between the first and sixth amendments
is afforded by the Nebraska "gag order" case, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976). The case involved pre-trial publicity surrounding a murder which had attracted
national attention. The prosecutor and defendant's counsel asked the court for a restrictive
order to limit news coverage of the case. The resulting order specifically enumerated items
which the media would not be permitted to report.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, recognized the burden
placed upon courts to insure fair trials but refused to accept prior restraint of the press as a
method for meeting this burden. The Court had considered prior restraint before and found
it repugnant to the first amendment. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11 See, e.g., People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(attempt to compel journalist's testimony on a collateral issue entitled to first amendment
protection). But see People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (privilege must yield to accused's right to defend himself even where such privilege
is asserted on a collateral issue).
13 For an excellent summary of the history of grand jury powers, see Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part: 'No person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on ... indictment of a Grand Jury ....
15 United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
10 See, e.g., Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
906 (1968); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955); People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 235 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
18 8 J. WicMOaE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 71 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
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factors in some situations which would mitigate a general duty to tes-
tify,20 such factors are exceptions and are not considered lightly.2 1
Journalists have argued that they meet the requirements for such an
exception, but, as in the cases involving the sixth amendment, they
have not always succeeded.
22
Although the sixth amendment cases have been difficult to resolve,
the courts have had the benefit of a specific constitutional standard.
In grand jury cases, however, the courts have only a broad traditional
rule to guide them. While the absence of specific standards should not
detract from the importance of the rule, the process of balancing it
against a first amendment claim is more arbitrary and uncertain than
the balancing involved in a sixth amendment case. In practice the
courts have defined the standard as the fair and effective administra-
tion of justice,23 the public interest in self-protection,2 4 or the national
interest in self-preservation,25 all of which are more sweeping and less
easily applied than the more specific standards of the sixth amendment.
Because of the uncertainty inherent in a nebulous rule, the standard
can be applied in many ways. For example, a very broad interpretation
is possible, literal application of the "every man's evidence" doctrine.
The very fact that a grand jury's function is investigatory rather than
prosecutory lends credence to this approach. It can be argued that if
the grand jury is to perform effectively, it should have at its disposal all
relevant evidence. Support for this approach can be found in cases
which hold that hearsay evidence is admissible in a grand jury pro-
ceeding,2 6 and that a defendant may be compelled to testify before the
grand jury.27  In such a reading of the rule, a qualified journalist's privi-
lege would be given short shrift when weighed against the grand jury's
all encompassing need for evidence.2 8  Another possibility would be a
restrictive interpretation of the standard. A court may decide that the
20 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (citizen's duty to testify is
subject to mitigation in exceptional circumstances, such as those involving public policy).
At common law other mitigating circumstances were recognized, including forfeiture of an
estate, self-incrimination, disgrace, infamy, or public ridicule. See Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
21 8 J. WImoMRE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See, e.g., United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (only substantive individual interest tested by centuries
of experience may outweigh duty to testify).
2 See People v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W. 2d 93 (1971) (public interest in
fair and effective administration of justice overrode its interest in the free dissemination of
news); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P .2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968)
(journalist enjoyed no special evidentiary privilege which exempted her from general pub-
lic duty to testify). But see, In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(journaists granted protective order so that they did not have to testity about anonymous
sources, but order was subject to modification upon a showing by the government of a
compelling and overriding need which could not be met by other means).
23 People v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W. 2d 93 (1971).
24 Id.
21 In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
2 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
27 United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955).
28 Some courts may take the position that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings would




standard is so broad as to be virtually incapable of application. In such a
case, the court would probably be inclined to uphold the first amend-
ment claim unless a more specific need for the information could be
shown.29
The problem with cases involving either the sixth amendment or
grand jury proceedings is that the courts are faced with a weighing of
difficult abstract standards each time a journalist claims a privilege. The
court must take into account all the particular circumstances of the
case, and then perform a feat of constitutional juggling. The lower fed-
eral courts and state courts have struggled with this issue with little
helpful precedent to guide them.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the evidentiary privilege
issue in the Bransburg v. Hayes trilogy.30 The reporters in each case
had refused to testify before a grand jury as to the identity of their
sources or personal observations garnered from interviews with the
sources. Each reporter asserted a claim of privilege against revealing
the information sought by the grand juries.31
The Court completely disposed of any notion of testimonial privi-
lege as it related to grand jury proceedings. It found that a balancing of
competing interests was inappropriate because it could not "accept the
argument that the public interest in possible future news about crime
from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the
public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the
press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes
in the future."32 The Court held that if a privilege is to be recognized,
most dangerous situation. Because the proceedings are secret, the source will never know
whether the journalist has or has not given the desired testimony. Therefore, some
reporters decline even to appear at the proceedings in order to avoid the appearance of
having revealed a source. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
rev'd sub nom, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This case was noted in 84
HARv. L. REV. 1536 (1971).
29See In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Balancing is
the traditional judicial method of dealing with constitutional questions. The end result is
a ruling that turns on the particular facts involved. Other persons in similar situations
have nothing concrete to guide them in determining the correctness or incorrectness of the
particular position they are asserting. Such uncertainty works a great hardship in ordinary
cases, but this hardship is magnified with respect to an institution such as the press.
Journalists wary of crossing a nebulous line which could lead them to prison or to being
discredited may in fact err on the side of caution. The result can be an impairment of the
functioning of the press and, in the end, it is the public which suffers.
30 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The lower court cases were Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W. 2d
345 (Ct. App. Ky. 1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E. 2d 297 (1971); Caldwell v.
United States, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.) rev'd, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). See
also Note, Constitutional Law - Branzburg v. Hayes - Must Newsmen Reveal Their Con-
fidential Sources to Grand Juries?, 8 WAKE FoRsr L. REV. 567 (1972); 61 Ky. L. J. 551
(1973); 18 ViL.L. L. REV. 288 (1972). While a thorough analysis of Branzburg is tangential to
this Note, the interested reader can find such analyses in Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and
the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HAsT[Ns L. J. 709 (1975); Murasky,
The journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974).
31 While Branzburg claimed that his privilege stemmed from the Kentucky shield
statute, Pappas and Caldwell argued for first amendment protection. In the lower courts
only Caldwell was successful in his argument, and then only in the court of appeals.
32 408 U.S. at 695.
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it should be created by enactment of state legislature and not derived
by the courts from the Constitution.33
The Branzburg rule applies only to journalists' claims of privilege
before grand juries. In other proceedings, it is still necessary to apply
the balancing test.
Civil lawsuits provide another fertile area for journalists to assert
claims of privilege. The most prominent assertion of the privilege oc-
curs in the context of libel suits, though privilege claims have not been
restricted to these actions. Garland v. Torre3 4 established the text to be
used in libel cases. Following Garland, the balancing test became the
accepted judicial tool for resolving the privilege issue in this difficult
area.
35
The libel cases seem to have developed a standard that is unique to
their circumstances. To understand it one must look to the nature of a
libel suit in relation to news entities and public figures. In New York
Times v. Sullivan,36 Justice Brennan discussed the standard of proof in
libel actions. Respondent Sullivan, a public official in Montgomery,
Alabama, brought suit against the New York Times claiming that he
had been libeled by advertisements appearing in the newspaper.37 The
Supreme Court, in reversing the state court and striking down an Ala-
bama statute, held that the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
the press were of primary importance and that special safeguards were
required to protect those rights. Libel laws such as the one in force in
Alabama at the time3 8 were found to have a detrimental effect on the
Constitutional guarantee. Therefore, the Court held that the Constitution
required that a public official could not recover damages in a libel ac-
tion unless he could prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
offensive material was published with "actual malice"3 9 - either with
the knowledge of its untruth or with "reckless disregard" 40 as to
whether it was true.
The disadvantage of allowing a journalist to assert a privilege for
confidentiality of sources in libel cases is obvious. If the journalist is
33 Id. at 706.
34 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See notes 5-7
supra and accompanying text.
I- See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974)
(investigative journalist ordered to testify as to his source because information deemed
necessary to plaintiff's libel action); Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974) (defendants did not have a compelling need for revelation
of reporter's sources sufficient to override public's right to know). See also Caldero v.
Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791 (1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 418
(1977) (public's right to know does not outweigh quest for truth in courtroom).
- 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31 Id. at 256-58.
3' Alabama used the concept libel per se. Something was libelous per se if it injured
a person in his reputation or brought him into public contempt. Once libel per se was
established, the only defense allowable was truth, which had to be proven to the jury. Id. at 267.





permitted to cloak the identity of the source or the information given by
the source, the plaintiff will be all but helpless in proving the actual
malice that the New York Times rule requires. 41 Thus, the public inter-
est in the fair and effective administration of justice42 and the right
to "every man's evidence"43 often combine in libel situations to pro-
vide the compelling interest needed to override the journalist's claim. 44
Not all civil cases in which a privilege is asserted involve libel. In
other civil cases the standard against which the claim is to be weighed
resembles the "every man's evidence" standard utilized in grand jury
cases. The courts, however, have looked upon claims of privilege in other
civil cases with more favor. 45  While the balancing test is employed,
the standard is very different from that employed in criminal cases. One
distinction is the lack of constitutionally-mandated guidelines such as
those of the sixth amendment in criminal cases. Grand jury and civil
cases, however, are more similar. In both proceedings the "every man's
evidence" standard prevails, but this standard is flexible and takes on
41 Reporter Britt Hume, sued by a public offlicial about whom he had published allegedly
defamatory news articles, apparently recognized this aspect of libel actions. In his con-
curring opinion in Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938
(1974). Judge MacKinnon agreed with the court that permitting non-disclosure of sources
would virtually immunize the media from responsibility for their libelous publications.
Judge MacKinnon further pointed out that Hume had recognized this in an article he had
published in the New York Times Magazine, December 17, 1972: "Yet Carey has a point.
If newsmen can refuse to name the source of defamatory stories, they can effectively
vitiate what is left of the libel laws (after New York Times v. Sullivan) by hiding behind
anonymous sources whenever sued." 492 F.2d at 640 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
42 People v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971). See notes 14-29 supra
and accompanying text.
43 8 J. Wicsom, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 71 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See notes 14-29
supra and accompanying text.
44 Some courts have found in favor of the privilege. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d
986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) is illustrative. Mayor Cervantes of
St. Louis, accused by Time Magazine of having underworld connections, sued a Time
Magazine reporter for libel. During the extensive pre-trial discovery, Cervantes deposed
the reporter, who answered that most of his information had come from sources in the
Justice Department and in the Federal Bureau of Investigation but refused to divulge their
names. He claimed that the principles of the first amendment would be violated by the
inhibition on the dissemination of news which would follow if he, as a professional jour-
nalist, could not effectively guarantee the anonymity of his sources. Cervantes countered
with the assertion that, without disclosure, he would be unable to test the credibility of the
sources or to scrutinize the journalist's reporting, and thus would be prevented from
effectively meeting the strict burden of proof required by the New York Times rule. While
the court sympathized with Cervantes and agreed that his claims were not frivolous, it
found that Cervantes had failed to show that the reporter or the magazine had acted in a
libelous fashion. Although a testimonial privilege for journalists had not been recognized
by most courts, the Eighth Circuit held that to require a journalist to reveal confidential
sources in libel cases "without first inquiring into the substance of a libel allegation would
utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay the line of cases articulating
the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement of State libel laws."
Id. at 993.
11 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(journalist's claim of privilege to protect the free flow of news upheld in a tort action
as more compelling than the need for the information); Accord, Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F.
Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (the public interest in liberal discovery was outweighed by
potential for hampering the free flow of news if the journalist is compelled to reveal
sources).
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different meanings depending on the circumstances of the case. Thus,
in grand jury cases the standard reflects the compelling need of the grand
jury to perform its functions effectively, and promotes the public interest
in punishment and prevention of crime. In libel cases, strict application
of the standard depends upon the plaintiff's difficulty in meeting the
heavier burden of proof unique to these cases, and the journalist's claim
usually has to give way to the competing claims of the plaintiff. There
is a distinct turnabout in civil cases not involving libel; the claims of
journalistic privilege are usually upheld against the countervailing in-
terests of "every man's evidence" and the fair administration of justice.
This divergence between the types of cases can best be understood
by examining the ultimate goals achieved in compelling testimony. In
grand jury cases the basic preservation of the values of society is the
ultimate concern, while in libel cases the basic issue is often the securing
of the only evidence which will enable the plaintiff to meet the burden
of proof to establish the claim. The need for the information is not as
compelling in ordinary civil actions; such actions are wholly private, as
opposed to criminal cases which involve the public interest. When the
purely private interest in source disclosure is weighed against the public
interest in the free flow of news, social policy requires upholding the
reporter's claim.46
Generally, the outcome of a civil action is of lesser significance for
society than the outcome of a criminal action. 47 The former involves
the possible loss of money, while the latter involves the loss of liberty or
life. The different public interest considerations in each are obvious.
While the potential loss of liberty or life is compelling enough to override
the constitutional demands of the first amendment, the potential loss of
money is not.48
A different question is posed when a journalist claims a right to re-
main silent in legislative investigations. Here, the first amendment
guarantees come into direct conflict with the powers of Congress. As
the lawmaking body, Congress has the power and authority to conduct
investigations as a corollary to its legislative function. This power to
investigate, although broad, is not without its limits. 4 As early as 1881,
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress did not possess a general
power of inquiry over the affairs of a private citizen50 even though
46 Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972).
17 Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976).
48 That the law regards the interests differently in civil and criminal proceedings is
well illustrated by the different standard of proof required in each. Criminal actions
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt while in civil cases the burden of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence.
" See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 52-60 infra and
accompanying text.
-0 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). The Supreme Court recognized that
Congress possessed a contempt power as a corollary to its power to legislate in Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Anderson, who refused to answer the charges of
the House of Representatives, was ordered into custody in order to have him brought be-




Congress by statute may call witnesses to testify before it and punish those
who prove reticent.5 1
The use of the legislative investigation expanded during the McCarthy
Era's intensive search for Communists. It was during this period that
first amendment values were exposed to the threat of congressional
inquiry by the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American
Activities (HUAC). In Watkins v. United States,52 Watkins, a labor
union official, was called to testify before HUAC. He testified freely
about his own political affiliations, and was willing to disclose the iden-
tity of Communist Party members known to him as long as they were
still members, but he refused to testify about persons who had aban-
doned party connections. He was convicted of contempt of Congress
for his refusal to answer. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
In discussing the scope of Congress' investigative power, the Court held
that any inquiry had to be in furtherance of a legitimate congressional
end.5 3  While the Court recognized the duty of every citizen to appear
and testify before a congressional investigative body, the witness'
constitutional rights, including first amendment rights, had to be pro-
tected.5 4
Two years later, the case of Barenblatt v. United States55 presented
a further inquiry into the limits of Congress' investigative power. A
HUAC subcommittee subpoenaed Barenblatt, who had been a graduate
student and teaching fellow at the University of Michigan and a psy-
chology instructor at Vassar College. He objected on first amendment
grounds to the subcommittee's right to question him with respect to his
political beliefs or associational activities. 56 The Supreme Court de-
termined that the tenets of the first amendment served as a limiting
contemptuous witnesses until it adjourned. Sixty years later in Kilboum, however, the
Court severely curtailed Congress' power to punish recalcitrant witnesses by limiting its
use to those cases in which the testimony was required in a matter over which Congress
had investigative jurisdiction. Consequently, Kilbourn could not be imprisoned
for his refusal to testify in front of the House of Representatives concerning the activities
of his partnership. For a concise history of British and American legislative investiga-
tions, see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
-1 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either
House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under
inquiry ...willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer
any questions pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine ... and imprisonment ...
52 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
13 This required a clearly defined, legitimate congressional purpose, which could per-
mit an investigation into an individual's affairs. The critical factor was the "existence of,
and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures
from an unwilling witness." Id. at 198.
54 Id.
5- 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
56 The subcommittee forwarded a request to the House of Representatives for institu-
tion of criminal contempt proceedings. In the ensuing trial, Barenblatt was convicted
of contempt. The Supreme Court, which had granted certiorari, vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the decision in Watkins.
The conviction was reaffirmed, and again, certiorari was granted.
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factor on congressional investigations. 57 When a witness asserted first
amendment guarantees to prevent inquiry into certain areas, the Court
held that a balancing of the competing public and private interests was
required.58 Justices Black and Douglas, together with Chief Justice
Warren, dissented, taking a more absolutist position. They found the
balancing test to be vague and uncertain, imputing a qualification to
first amendment rights which did not exist. 59 In the view of the dis-
senting justices, first amendment rights were not intended to be pro-
tected only when the courts deemed it reasonable.60
Thus, while Congress and the state legislatures possess a power to
investigate, a corollary to the legislative function, this power is limited by
constitutional constraints.6' Such investigations are generally governed
by the balancing test to determine whether the request for disclosure
will prevail against the witness' first amendment claim.62
C. The Scope of the Privilege
In examining the journalist's claim of privilege, some commentators have
noted that the common law is not the place to begin, and that it is better to
assume a presumption of a constitutional privilege and then to entertain
justifications 'or denying it.63 As has been shown, this appears to be the trend,
with the justification for denying the privilege found in the use of the
57 360 U.S. at 126.
51 Id. Barenblatt also reiterated that the investigation had to be related to a valid
legislative purpose, and that all questions must be relevant and pertinent.
19 360 U.S. at 143 (Black, J., dissenting).
60 Compare Justice Black's dissent in Barenblatt with his dissent in Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431, 442 (1961). Black maintained that the first amendment was abso-
lute, and the balancing test represented an encroachment upon its principles.
61 States, too, have the power to subpoena witnesses for civil and criminal proceed-
ings, and presumably for legislative investigations. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
2945.46 (Page 1975). There also exist state laws for punishing a recalcitrant witness
by contempt. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN § 2705.02 (Page 1954) which provides for
holding a person in contempt who disobeys a court order, who resists a subpoena, who
refuses to be sworn or answer as a witness, or who fails to appear as a witness.
As to state legislative investigations, the Supreme Court in Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) followed the principles of Watkins by limiting state investi-
gative power in the tace ot conflicting constitutional interests.
'2 During the summer of 1976, Daniel Schorr, then a newsman for the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), was called to testify before the House Select Committee on
Intelligence which was investigating the leak of a secret report on Central Intelligence
Agency operations to a New York newspaper, the Village Voice. Schorr refused to re-
veal the source of his information. A constitutional argument was avoided when the
House of Representatives Ethics Committee did not cite Schorr for contempt. For a de-
tailed account of this incident, see Investigation of Publication of Select Comm. on In-
telligence Report: Hearings Before the Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct Pursuant
to H.R. 1042, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 577 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 354
F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972) (right to fair trial outweighs any burden on newsgathering);
in re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (Need for testimony out-
weighs burden on newsgathering). See also Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). For a discussion of this case, see notes 5-7 supra and
accompanying test.
3 Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their




balancing test. There are some perplexing problems with this approach,
however, which make it a less than satisfactory solution to a complex
question.
Where the more common evidentiary privileges such as lawyer-client and
doctor-patient are involved, only the client or the patient has the right to
waive the privilege. With the journalist's privilege, however, the confiden-
tiality lies with the journalist, not the source, so that the journalist is the only
one who can waive. 4 In the usual case, the client and patient are known; it is
the information they impart to their lawyer or doctor which is protected. But
in the journalist-source relationship, only the journalist is known; it is the very
identity of the source, the other party to the relationship, which is sought to be
protected by the privilege.
In the cases examined thus far, the reporter involved was attempting
to keep the identities of the sources secret. There are some cases, how-
ever, in which the reporter is seeking to keep the information confi-
dential. These attempts generally occur in one of three situations: where
the source is already known, where the source is unknown but the
journalist fears that revelation of the information will lead to the identity
of the source, and where there is no source at all. Claims of privileged
information in situations in which the source is already known have not
fared well. In United States v. Liddy,6 5 a subpoena duces tecum was
issued to John Lawrence of the Los Angeles Times to produce materials
which related to an interview with Alfred C. Baldwin, III. These materials
had been subpoenaed from Baldwin, but had been destroyed. The
material was not sought for discovery purposes, but as relevant evidence
for the defense.
Because Baldwin had previously been identified as the source, the
Los Angeles Times asserted a claim of privilege based upon the confi-
dentiality of the communication. The court denied the claim, stating
that under Branzburg, the justification for a privilege was outweighed
by the defendant's need for evidence.66
The New York Supreme Court similarly refused to find a privilege
64 See, e.g., Lightman v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). See also Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testi-
monial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1111 (1960). The source could, of course, come for-
ward personally or permit the journalist to divulge his or her identity. In this sense the
source, too, has the power to waive the privilege. Consider, however, the following hy-
pothetical. A journalist called to testify on behalf of a defendant at trial refuses to name
me source, and after being found in contempt is sent to jail. The source then comes
forward and reveals his identity. The journalist has said nothing. Is the journalist still
in contempt? It would appear that he is, because the source revealed himself and the
journalist remained silent. How, then, could the journalist purge himself of the contempt
if the information sought has been discovered through other means, such as self-disclosure
by the source?
65 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972).
66 Judge Sirica pointed out that the Los Angeles Times has breached the confidence
by publishing the interviews after Baldwin's lawyer had requested it not to. For an ac-
count of the hearing, see C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODwARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 224-25
(1974).
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for confidential information in People v. Wolf.6 7  After prison riots, a
reporter obtained a manuscript which had been written by an inmate,
and published it under the inmate's by-line in the Village Voice. A
subpoena duces tecum was served on the paper and its editor for produc-
tion of the original manuscript because the District Attorney claimed
the manuscript was a confession.
The court refused to find a privilege by distinguishing between a
case in which a newspaper or a journalist claimed a privilege to with-
hold a confession from the proper tribunal when the confession was
authored by a person under indictment, and a case in which a privilege
was asserted to maintain the secrecy of an unknown source. The cases
falling into the former class were found to be undeserving of constitutional
protection.
Cases in the second category, in which the source is unknown but
revelation of the information might lead to the identity, have fared little
better. In two separate cases involving the same radio newsman, no
privilege was found. In the first case, In re Lewis,6 8 the newsman's
radio station received a communique from a revolutionary group which
had claimed responsibility for a Los Angeles hotel bombing. The police
attempted to get the communique from the newsman, even searching
the radio station, but to no avail. A subpoena duces tecum was finally
issued for production of the information. In subsequent proceedings,
the newsman's claim of privilege under the first amendment was re-
jected by the Ninth Circuit.
In the other case involving Lewis, Lewis v. United States,69 the
unfortunate newsman received a tape recording from a revolutionary
group. The Court denied a privilege to withhold the tape from law
enforcement personnel, adopting the reasoning of Branzburg.70
Cases in the third category, in which there is no source per se, have
been no more successful. The most common case of this type involves
the journalist who has personally observed criminal activity.7 1 Thus, a
journalist who observed two persons making hashish from marijuana, 72
and a journalist who observed the Black Panthers inside their head-
quarters,73 have been held not to have a privilege to remain silent as
to whom they observed or where they observed it.
67 60 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 39 App. Div. 2d
864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972).
88 384 F. Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).
19 354 F. Supp. 138 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
70 354 F. Supp. at 140.
71 The overlapping between this category and the one immediately preceeding is ap-
parent. The journalist is reluctant to reveal what he saw or where he saw it for fear that
such information will lead to discovery of the source. Thus, the distinction between the
categories is more of degree than concept.
72 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ct. App. Ky. 1971), afi'd sub nom. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
13 In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971), aff'd sub non.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Pappas had neither written a story nor other-
wise revealed what he had observed. For a discussion of this case, see notes 30-33 supra
and accompanying text
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In Lightman v. Maryland,'7  a reporter who was covering a "head
shop" for a story observed drug use. He was summoned by a grand
jury, and asked to state the location of the "head shop" and to describe
the shopkeeper. He refused, claiming that the shopkeeper was a source,
and that disclosure of the location of the shop would lead to the dis-
covery of the source. 5 The court refused to accept Lightman's premise,
holding that only sources were privileged, not communications.16
Although it is the journalist who must assert the privilege,7 7 it is
necessary to determine who is protected by it. There can be little doubt
that the first amendment, in the ultimate effect, is for the benefit of all
Americans. In its immediate effect, however, it is meant to safeguard
the press as an institution. As Justice Stewart noted, "[m]ost of the
other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or specific
rights of individuals. In contrast, the free press clause extends protec-
tion to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only or-
ganized private business that is given explicit constitutional protec-
tion."78
While this approach may offend a sense of equal protection under
the law, the public is the ultimate beneficiary of such an institutional
protection. Indeed, the claim of privilege which rests on the first
amendment is based upon the detriment to the public which would occur
if there was an impediment to the free flow of information.79  The media
are characterized as "the principal watch-dogs and protectors of honest,
as well as good government."' 0 Thus, there is a strong public policy
which favors an extension of constitutional protection to an institution.
At least one court has looked at this from a different perspective.
In State v. Buchanan,8' the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to find a
journalist's privilege under the first amendment, stating in dictum that
to do so might invite governmental intrusion into the journalistic field
in order to define who qualifies for such a privilege. The court noted
that the first amendment served to protect the general public, not only
those persons possessing the credentials of a journalist.8 2
TI 16 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973).
75 Lightman admitted that the shopkeeper did not know he was a reporter, but claimed
that any time information is communicated to a journalist in confidence such informa-
tion is privileged, even if the communicant does not know he is a journalist.
76 The court held that, in order to be confidential, the communication had to origi-
nate in the confidence that it would not be disclosed without the consent of the communi-
cant. For a discussion of "off the record" information, see Note, The Newsman's Privi-
lege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160 (1976).
77 See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
78 Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (1974), reprinted in Stokes, Dan
Shorr's Courage Makes the Difference, The Village Voice, Sept. 27, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
71 See, e.g., Lightman v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); People v. Knops, 49
Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
80 In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
11 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
82 Id. For a discussion of who qualifies as a reporter, see Note, Reporters and Their
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II. SHIELD LAWS: A STATUTOeY RESPONSE TO AMBIGUITY
The controversy surrounding the evidentiary privilege for journalists
is ongoing, and the judicial approach has been less than satisfactory.
Some states have chosen to meet this problem through legislative en-
actment of "shield laws," so named because they shield the journalist
from forced revelation of information. At this time, twenty-six states
have enacted legislation giving a testimonial privilege to journalists;8 3
these statutes, lack uniformity, however, and provide protection in vary-
ing degrees. s4
Shield statutes have helped to resolve some of the problems with
the judicial approach. The person to be protected by the statute is
usually clearly defined, as is what is to be protected. Some statutes
cover only the source of a reporter's information, while others include
the information.8 5  Furthermore, the statutes frequently avoid the
worst problem with the judicial approach by creating an absolute priv-
ilege, thus obviating the need for a balancing test. No statute, of
course, can clear up all problems surrounding a complex issue, and the
application of a statute must always depend upon judicial construction.
A. The Difficulties Inherent in the Statutory Approach
The statutes extend the protective shield to a defined class of per-
sons.8 6 In so doing, the state legislatures were implicitly attempting
to define "the press." Consequently, at least one court has held that a
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L. J. 317
(1970); 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160 (1976).
13 Those states with shield laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. For a summary of each statute, see CoNc.
RESEARCH SERVICE, NEWSMEN'S PRIVILECE: A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THE NEWS MEDIA 55-56 (rev. ed. 1976).
' Id. at 27-65. A typical shield law is that of Ohio, which provides:
No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any news-
paper or any press association for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compil-
ing, editing, disseminating, or publishing news shall be required to disclose the
source of any information procured or obtained by such person in the course of
his employment in any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any court,
grand jury, petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the presiding officer of any
tribunal, or his agent, or before any commission, department, division, or
bureau of this state, or before any county or municipal body, officer or commit-
tee thereof
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954). The protection afforded by the Ohio
shield statute was extended to the broadcast media. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04
(Page Supp. 1976).
" See, e.g., Forest Hills Util. Co. v. Heath, 37 Ohio Misc. 30, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P.
1973). The court held that the Ohio shield law permitted the journalist to conceal only
the name of the informant; the information itself was not protected. There still remains
the problem of defining a source. In Forest Hills Utility Co., the court stated that the
term "source" should be limited to persons since only they can be encouraged to reveal
information. Id. at 35, 302 N.E.2d at 596.
" The privilege can thus inure to "[a] publisher, editor, reporter, or other person
connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,




journalist whose endeavors were not explicitly covered by the statute
was not entitled to keep his source confidential. 87
It is possible that an attempt to define by statute the members of
the press may result in an infringement upon first amendment guaran-
tees by forcing the courts to intrude into the journalistic field to delin-
eate the membership."' It is more likely, however, that it will lead to a
more effective functioning of the press. As Justice Stewart has noted:
If it is to perform its constitutional mission, the press must do
far more than merely print public statements or public prepared
handouts. Familiarity with the people and circumstances in-
volved in the myriad background activities that result in the
final product called "news" is vital to complete and responsible
journalism, unless the press is to be a captive mouthpiece of
"newsmakers." 9
It would appear, therefore, that even if the state legislatures did invade
the journalistic field to the extent of determining who qualifies for a
statutory testimonial privilege, the invasion would be minimal in com-
parison with the benefit to the functioning of the press.
Some shield statutes cover only the source of the information 0
while others protect both the source and "off-the-record" information.9
Defining a "source" within the purview of the statute, however, remains
a problem similar to that encountered under the judicial approach.
A journalist's personal observations of criminal activity have gener-
ally been held to be outside the statutory protection as a source.9 2
Those things which do not directly impinge on the source's identity have
likewise been unprotected. 3 Consequently, the courts have construed
employed." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1978); "any editor, reporter, or other
writer for any newspaper or periodical, . . . or manager or owner of any radio station."
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); "journalist or newscaster, or working associates of a
journalist or newscaster." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1976). See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1976).
s7 In Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the court held that a maga-
zine reporter was not included in the statutory definition. Cohane, a reporter for a mag-
azine, had written an allegedly libelous article about Cepeda, a baseball player for the
San Francisco Giants. Cohane refused to reveal his source during a deposition. Since
the California shield statute covered only journalists connected with newspapers, press
associations, wire services, radio, or television stations the court held that it had to "be
guided by the rule of strict statutory construction." Id. at 472.
Is State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968). See also Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which the
court would not determine a journalist's status in the profession.
89 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
90 See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (West Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN.
S,34-3-5-1 [2-17a31 (Burns 1973); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04, .12 (Page 1954 &
Supp. 1976).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); Micti. CoMp. LAws ANN.
§ 767.5a (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West Supp. 1978).
92 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. Ky. 1971), afl'd sub nom. Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Lightman v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d
149 (1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d
493 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
93 See State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943). A journalist who knew
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a source to include only someone who or something which actually gave
the reporter the information. Even this limitation is not without prob-
lems, however, due to the sometimes broad, sometimes narrow appli-
cation by the courts. For example, one court has construed the stat-
ute liberally, holding that sources of information included documents
as well as persons, 94 while other courts have been unwilling to reach
this result.9 5
The problem is further complicated in much the same way as under
the judicial approach - establishing a dichotomy between a source per
se and pure information. Shield statutes have attempted to solve this
problem by indicating exactly what is protected as sources, or as sources
and information,9 6 but classification in this area has not been easy.
The New York Supreme Court in People v. Wolf9 7 confronted the prob-
lem when it found a manuscript written under a prisoner's by-line
unprotected by the New York shield statute.
It is evident that the statutory approach to the testimonial privilege
for journalists is a vast improvement over the haphazard, catch-as
catch-can judicial approach. At a minimum, the statutory method
eliminates much of the discretion which was problematic with the judi-
cial approach. Nevertheless, shield laws present unique problems in
terms of public policy considerations. If any advantages are to be rec-
ognized with the judicial approach, they are to be found in the fact that
the balancing test recognizes the competing policies involved. The
for journalists is a vast improvement over the haphazard, catch-as-
policy "which has placed the gathering and the protection of the source
of news as of greater importance to the public interest and of more
value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime or
the alleged criminal."98
Still, many courts have circumvented the strict mandates of these
statutes.99 For example, the courts have exercised discretion in deter-
the source and had printed it in his newspaper was asked the means by which the source
had conveyed the information for publication. The court held that the narrow question
was who had taken the information to the paper. Such act of communication was ob-
viously intended by the source; the legislative intent behind the shield law would not
preclude revelation of this kind of information. Judge Donges, in the dissenting opinion,
failed to see the distinction between the source and the means of communication to the
journalist. He noted that the source was not the one who had made the news, but merely
the one who gave it to the reporter. Id. at 489, 30 A.2d at 429 (Donges, J., dissenting in
part).
In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
o See, e.g., Forest Hills Util. Co. v. Heath, 37 Ohio Misc. 30, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P.
1973) (source restricted to "animate objects").
"I For a discussion of the similar problem arising in the dichotomy resulting from a
legislative definition imposed upon the term press, see notes 86-89 supra and accompany-
ing text.
17 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 39 App. Div. 2d
864, N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972). The case presents a classic example of meticulous statutory
construction of N.Y. Civ. Ricmrs LAW §§ 79-h(a)(8), 79-h(b) (McKinney 1976).
in re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (412 Pa. 32) (1963).
o' See, e.g., People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1975)




mining what constitutes a waiver of the statutory privilege. Since the
privilege is that of the journalist, and not of the source, the journalist
may waive it if he desires. 10 Some courts which take a dim view of the
privilege have broadly applied the waiver concept to defeat an assertion
of the privilege. One court which denied a first amendment privilege
held that the statutory protection could be waived merely by the disclo-
sure of any part of the privileged material, if there was no coercion and
if there was knowledge of a privilege not to disclose.1° 1 Conversely,
another court which construed the shield statute liberally held that
waiver of the statutory privilege would only apply to statements made
by the informant which were actually published or disclosed, and not to
statements made by the informant to the newsperson.1
0 2
While some courts, through the exercise of discretion in determining
statutory construction, have apparently distorted the legislature's intent
in creating the shield statutes, few have questioned the wisdom of en-
acting these statutes. 13  Judicial activism in this area has been growing,
however, with the most notable examples occurring in California and
New Mexico. In Farr v. Superior Court,'0" a reporter for a California
newspaper had obtained a memorandum of the prospective testimony of
a witness in a murder trial. In the investigation which followed publi-
cation of this information, Farr refused to divulge the source who had
but merely prevented those journalists asserting it from being cited for contempt); Lightman
v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972) (statute did not apply because alleged
source informed against herself, unaware that she was speaking to a reporter, and news-
man's personal observations were the actual source). The Monroe holding is evasive. The
court acknowledged that the New York shield statute prevents a journalist from being held
in contempt for refusing to divulge his sources, but does not protect him from compulsory
process. However, the court further held that the statutory privilege would have to yield if
the defendant required the information for due process reasons. Since the defendant in
Monroe failed on procedural matters to force disclosure, the court never reached the
issue of what would happen if the privilege did not apply and the journalist persisted in
his refusal, since admittedly the court could not sanction him with contempt proceedings
under the statute.
See also, Stokes v. Lorain Journal Co., 26 Ohio Misc. 219, 266 N.E.2d 857 (C.P. 1970),
in which the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County held that the Ohio Supreme
Court, in adopting the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, never contemplated that OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954), OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11, or U.S. CONST. amend. I would
inhibit or prohibit the eliciting of information necessary for the preparation of a tort action,
or that libel suits did not fall within the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accord, Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).
The New Jersey court held that the respondent newspaper, in basing its defense on having
received the information from a source but without disclosing that source, denied the jury
the chance to determine whether in fact the source was reliable. The court decided that
the legislature's intent in creating the New Jersey shield law could not have been to afford
newspapers a hiding place when their own actions gave rise to a question of liability.
1o0 See, e.g., Lightman v. Maryland, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972); State v.
Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
'01 In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973). Accord, Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123
A.2d 473 (1956).
112 In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
'03 See, e.g., Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (court declined to ques-
tion the legislature's wisdom in creating the statute).
" 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972). For an analysis of Farr, see 51 WASH. L. REV. 1005 (1976).
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given him the memorandum. Farr based his refusal to testify in part
upon the California shield law. The court, however, never reached the
point of construing the shield statute. Instead, it summarily dismissed
the statute as "an unconstitutional interference by the legislative
branch with an inherent and vital power of the court to control its own
proceedings and officers."' 0 5 The court acknowledged the power of the
legislature to reasonably restrict or prescribe procedures for the exer-
cise of the court's contempt power, but denied the legislature's right to
determine what should constitute contempt. The court held that be-
cause it had a duty to prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity, it had a con-
comitant obligation to investigate violations of its orders by its own of-
ficers. 106
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Ammerman v. Hub-
bard Broadcasting, Inc.,'10 7 invalidated the state's shield law. A jour-
nalist, who had been named as the defendant in a libel action, was re-
quested to name one of his sources. He refused, claiming that the state's
shield statute granted him a privilege not to testify about his source.
The court, after noting that historically only the judiciary could exercise
power over its functions, declared the statute unconstitutional. The
court stated that in creating the shield statute, the legislature had at-
tempted to promulgate new rules of evidence comparable to those al-
ready adopted by the court. Such rules of evidence were of a procedural
nature, governing the functioning of the court itself, and were within
the exclusive province of the courts to exercise for the sake of clarity
and uniformity in procedure, pleading, and practice. 08 The shield stat-
ute was found to conflict with an already established rule of evidence.
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to decide the con-
stitutionality of shield statutes, but cases such as Farr and Ammerman
raise perplexing questions concerning the separation of power between
the legislative and judicial branches.
Following the decision in Farr, the California courts were confronted with
another case involving the shield statute. In Rosato v. Superior Court,109 the
trial court had ordered transcripts of a grand jury proceeding sealed to avoid
detrimental pre-trial publicity. An article printed in the Fresno Bee after the
order contained quotations from the earlier proceedings. Assuming that the
publicity order had been violated, the court subpoenaed the journalists to
appear before it, but the reporters refused to answer any questions which
would have tended to disclose the nature and identity of their sources. The
journalists were subsequently cited for contempt. On appeal, the newsmen
argued that the California shield statute was absolute; while the California
105 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348; cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
106 Id. at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
1- 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
101 Id. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357.





Law Revision Commission had advocated limiting the scope of the privilege
for newspersons, the legislature had rejected it."10
In Rosato, it appeared that the California Court of Appeals was
faced merely with a problem of statutory construction. It was, but the
problem was severely confounded by the holding in Farr v. Superior
Court."' The court in Rosato held that the trial court had both the
right and the duty to issue its order concerning publicity and hold hear-
ings to investigate possible violations of it. It found that the California
shield statute was limited in its scope. The statute did not extend pro-
tection when there was participation in or observation of criminal ac-
tivity by the journalist nor could the statute infringe upon the judiciary's
duty to control its own personnel and proceedings as established in Farr.
The court determined that the principle upon which the judiciary had
the power to compel the journalists' testimony despite the shield statute
was the necessity of investigating violations of its orders as a means
of enforcing its constitutional duty to prevent prejudicial publicity by
its own personnel." 2 Thus, the protection of the shield statute was
held to extend to identification of sources who were subject to a court
order and violated it. However, if a question was overbroad to the
point where it would reveal that either a particular court officer or an
unrelated protected source was involved, it would not be permitted un-
der the shield statute. "The court is only entitled to ask questions di-
rected toward affirmatively determining if the information did come
from court officers or attaches."'" 3
Rosato, and similar cases such as Ammerman and Farr, are signifi-
110 Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari and Request for Stay at 2, Rosato v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1975). The petitioners claimed
that the legislature's purpose in drafting such a statute was to elevate the newsperson's
privilege to the status enjoyed by more established privileges such as the attorney-client
privilege. The petitioners reasoned that the shield law would be useless unless construed
broadly. They contended that there were five questions relating to the privilege: 1)
which journalist had the actual contact with the source; 2) where such contact was made;
3) the time of the contact; 4) how the information was actually obtained; and 5) the form
which the information took when received. As to factors 2 to 4, it can be readily seen
that disclosure of such information could easily provide leads to finding the source. While
the judicial approach generally refused to give credence to these claims, in a jurisdiction
which has statutorily recognized a newsperson's privilege, it would appear to defeat the
legislative purpose in enacting such a statute if there could be forced disclosure of such
leading information. As to factor 5, there is a possibility that this information could lead to
the source, but it is not as compelling as the preceding factors. Factor 5 would seem to go
more to CAL. EvID. CODE § § 10 7 0 (a) and (c) (West 1966), which protects unpublished infor-
mation. An admittedly weak argument could be made that, since only excerpts of the
transcript were published, disclosure of the form of the published information could lead
to disclosure of protected unpublished information. The first part, however, which is the
identity of the reporter who had actual contact with the source, is less susceptible of
protection by a statutory privilege. It has been demonstrated that a reporter-source
privilege, regardless of its status in relation to other privileges, is necessarily different in
one important respect: the privilege is that of the journalist, not that of the communicant.
See note 64 supra and accompanying text. There seems to be little reason why the
identity of the journalist should be protected.
" 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
112 51 Cal. App. 3d at 218-19, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
113 Id. at 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 450. Thus, the court proceeded to determine, on an
individual basis, which questions were permissible. These included:
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cant because they involve a constitutional confrontation problem such
as was encountered in the judicial balancing approach. While Rosato
narrowed the scope of the Farr court's blanket rejection of the shield
statute by holding the statute inapplicable only when the court is in-
volved in determining if court officers have violated court orders, the
holding still has a limitation - the separation of powers doctrine. The
court refused to find that the legislative branch could invade the judicial
province of keeping its own house in order. Thus, the legislature, it
seems, can go only so far in protecting journalists; no shield statute
can give them unqualified protection from non-disclosure if it purports
to impinge on the separation between the government branches. There-
fore, while a shield statute gives more protection to the journalist than
the judicial approach with its balancing test, the degree of protection
is still not absolute. Even in those jurisdictions in which the legislature
has acted, the journalist will still act at his own peril in some circum-
stances
B. Shield Laws in the Federal System
The federal shield law can be described in one word: non-existent.
Although there has been a continuing effort to persuade Congress to pass
such a law, this effort has met with failure.1
4
In codifying the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress was faced, in
the original draft, with thirteen rules pertaining to non-constitutional
privileges" 5 which were to be recognized by the federal courts. The
House Committee on the Judiciary rejected these, however, and adopted
Have you ever seen a copy of the grand jury transcript lying on Mr. Goodwin's
desk . . .?
Was the grand jury transcript obtained by you from the office of one of the persons
or classes of persons mentioned again going clear back to the defendants, without
their knowledge or consent?
Questions not requiring answers included:
Mr. Rosato, did you arrange to obtain for the Bee a copy of the grand jury tran-
script from some outside source?
Where were you when you first received a copy of the grand jury transcript?
Petitioners persisted in their refusal to answer questions which they felt would lead to
discovery of their sources, and were ordered to serve a fourteen-day coercive sentence in
jail. Conversation with Jim Bort (Nov. 1976). However, they were released prematurely
after convincing the judge that they would never reveal their sources. See Lewis, The
Press and Its Right to Silence: Not Yet Clarified, New York Times, Sept. 19, 1976, § 4,
at 1, col. 5.
14 See, e.g., H.R. 172, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (creating an absolute privilege
before Congress, any court, grand jury, or administrative body); H.R. 215 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (creating a qualified privilege before any federal or state proceedings); H.R.
562, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (creating an absolute privilege before Congress or any
federal court or administrative body); H.R. 6228, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (creating
an absolute privilege subject to certain conditions). From the Seventy-first Congress to
the Eighty-eighth, 23 bills creating a newsperson's privilege were introduced, eight of
which were in the Senate. None were passed. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89-m CONG., 2D. Sass., TiE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE (Comm. Print 1966).
115 The privileges included: lawyer-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient,
husband-wife, religious (clergyman-confidant), political vote, trade secrets, governmental,
and identity of government informant. There was no journalist privilege. 20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol26/iss3/7
JOURNALISTIC PRIVILEGE
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 10 which, in effect, left the law regarding
privilege as it stood, to be developed by federal courts under a uniform
standard applicable to civil and criminal cases. 1 7 That standard was to
be derived from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 118 The Com-
mittee on the Judiciary included a provision in the rule which required
the application of state law for privileges in civil actions and proceedings
when the issue is substantive rather than procedural." 9 The rationale
was to preclude federal law from superceding state law in substantive
areas and to prevent forum shopping in civil actions.
20
While there is no federal shield statute, the Department of Justice
has developed guidelines for government use when it is necessary to
subpoena members of the media.' 2' The guidelines were established to
balance the need to protect the freedom of the press with the Department
of Justice's obligation to the fair administration of justice. Thus, the
thrust of the guidelines is that, before issuing subpoenas to newspersons,
all reasonable attempts to obtain the information by other means should
be exhausted. If it becomes necessary to seek the information from the
media, negotiations should be attempted in order to reach an accommo-
dation. If negotiations should fail, express permission of the Attorney
General is necessary before a subpoena can be issued.12 2 The guidelines
further provide standards and conditions under which such subpoenas
may issue, as well as the subsequent questioning of the journalist. An
important aspect of the guidelines is that if a subpoena is issued without
the necessary authorization, the Justice Department will move, as a mat-
ter of course, to quash without prejudice. 12 3 While these guidelines do
not grant an evidentiary privilege to the press, they do express a federal
concern for journalists' rights. This concern, however, is not the same as
the protection which would be afforded by a federal shield law.
The problems inherent in enacting a federal shield law are the same
as those encountered in states which have passed shield laws, with one
addition; that is, whether Congress can enact a privilege which would be
binding in state proceedings. Congress, unlike the states, can exercise
116 FED. R. EVID. 501.
117 H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973).
l8 Id. FED. R. CRIM. P.26 stated in pertinent part:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall
be governed . . . by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
This was the 1973 edition of the Rules, which was subsequently amended. The "light of
reason and experience" standard has been incorporated into FED. R. EVID. 501.
119 See Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
120 H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973). See In re Lewis, 384 F.
Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal., 1974), afi'd, 517 F.2d 236 (1975). The court concluded that Congress
had rejected the pleas of the media for a federal shield law, preferring instead to maintain
the status quo.
121 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1973). For a history of the political development of these guide-
lines, see Note, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield
Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 160 (1976).
122 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a), .10(b), .10(c), .10(d) (1977).
1- 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(d) (1977).
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only constitutionally enumerated powers. Thus, there must be a clause
in the Constitution on which to base congressional enactment of a jour-
nalist's privilege.12 4
As has been suggested, the commerce clause 2 5 appears to be a
possible source on which to base such a statute. This clause has been
given extremely broad application. 2 6 Even purely intrastate activities
may be regulated if such activities, when combined with others which
are similar, affect interstate commerce. 27  Thus, a restaurant located in a
privately owned recreational facility was held to be subject to federal
regulation because it served interstate travelers, and because ingredients
of the bread and soft drinks served had been obtained out of state.128
It is possible that most aspects of the media could be covered by a
federal statute based on the commerce clause. For example, a newspaper
which obtained its newsprint, ink, or even the components of its presses
outside the state, a news agency which sent reporters to cover out of
state stories, or a television or radio network which reached beyond the
state of origin could come within the purview of a federal shield law. The
possibilities are endless, and it is evident that the courts could find at
least one aspect of a news organization which was involved in interstate
commerce.
Conceivably, the states would raise the objection that an interpretation
of the commerce clause so broad that the enactment of a federal shield
statute would encompass most of the media would permit Congress to
invade state sovereignty in contravention of the tenth amendment. 29
Traditionally, the tenth amendment has proved to be a weak foundation
for argument, and has been regarded with little favor by the courts.13 0
With the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery,l3' however, this trend may not represent current judicial think-
ing. The Court held in National League that there are certain funda-
mental areas which must be left to the states to insure their sovereignty.
Whether the functioning of the state judicial system is one of these funda-
mental areas must be left to the future litigation which would likely result
upon enactment of a federal shield statute.
124 See CONG. RESEARcH SERVICE, NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE: A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEws MEDIA 23-24 (rev. ed. 1976).
121 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
126 A full analysis of the commerce clause is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
mention must be made of this clause in order for the reader to gain an appreciation of its
implications with respect to a federal shield statute.
127 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
12' Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
l29 U.S. CONsr. amend. X states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
130 See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (the Court held that federal
legislation permitting non-lawyers to practice before the United States Patent Office was
valid so long as Congress had acted within the scope of its delegated powers); Reina v.
United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) (the Court held that Congress could grant immunity
from state criminal prosecution to further its ability to effectively exercise one of its




III. PREss DEPENDENCE UPON CONFIDENTIAL Sources:
THE "WHY" OF THE PROBLEM
In 1934, the Newspaper Guild recognized the following journalistic
canon of ethics: "That newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences
or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before other
judicial or investigatory bodies, and that the newspaperman's duty to
keep confidences shall include those he shared with one employer after he
has changed his employment." 13 2 Thus, there is a demand by the pro-
fession that journalists keep their sources confidential.
Jack Anderson, author of a nationally syndicated column, stated in an
affidavit submitted to the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct that he has built up a number of anonymous, credible sources at
all levels of government who have been invaluable to him in his work.
These sources have helped him to uncover stories involving major cor-
porate scandals and government deceit. 33 Anderson declared that the
information communicated by such sources has increased the public's
knowledge and awareness of government operations and has led to legis-
lative and judicial actions aimed at curbing governmental corruption.
Without the sources, he claims, many of the abuses would have gone
undetected. 34
Anderson views his sources as "people who view their primary obli-
gation as being to principles of open and honest government in a demo-
cratic society. They view deceit and corruption in general as a most
debilitating force in a democratic form of government. . . .[T]hey are
anti-corruption."' 3 5  Anderson noted that if access to these sources was
limited, it would result in a substantial threat to public knowledge of
government operations. 13 6
Frances Barnard, a Washington correspondent, also stated in the
House of Representatives' hearing on official conduct that many of her
stories were based upon information given to her by persons who would
not have revealed their knowledge unless assured of anonymity. 3 7 Other
journalists concurred with this assessment. 38
After conducting an empirical study, two authors found that many
news stories are indeed based on material provided by confidential
sources, 3 9 concluding that restriction of the practice of maintaining
'a' 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
132 CONG. RSEARCH SERVICE, NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE: A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEWS MEDIA 14 (rev. ed. 1976).
133 Investigation of Publication of Select Comm. on Intelligence Report: Hearings
before the Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct Pursuant to H.R. 1042, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 710-17 (1976) (affadavit of Jack Anderson).
131 Id. at 716.
135 Id.
136 Id.
"I Investigation of Publication of Select Comm. on Intelligence Report: Hearings
before the Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct Pursuant to H.R. 1042, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 719 (1976) (affadavit of Frances Roderick Barnard).
"a Id. at 728-41.
139 Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
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confidential sources could lead to a burden on newsgathering. This con-
tention is supported by the journalists. Robert Dudney, a Dallas reporter,
stated that the flow of information to the press would be adversely affected
if the sources feared exposure.140  Indeed, Jack Anderson reported that
his work has suffered the effects of the efforts to require the disclosure of
sources; one White House source expressed fear of retribution if exposed,
and refused to continue the relationship.14 1 In another instance, a Cali-
fornia journalist, upon contacting a source for confirmation of a tip, was
asked whether he would go to jail to protect the source. 142
The use of confidential informants is not new, nor is it restricted to
the press. The government has relied on the practice for many years, and
its use generally has been permitted. In Scher v. United States, 43 the
Supreme Court held that a police informant's identity could remain sec-
ret unless it was shown to be essential to the accused's defense. Nearly
twenty years later, the government was again permitted non-disclosure
of the identity of an informant who had been instrumental in the commis-
sion of the crime. In Rovario v. United States,144 the Court held that an
informer's privilege of remaining anonymous helped to further and pro-
tect the public interest in law enforcement because it helped to encour-
age citizens to report crimes to the police.
However, the Court found that the privilege was not without limits.
For example, it would no longer apply once the informant's identity had
been revealed. Further, when the identity or the information given by
the informant was "relevant and helpful"' 45 to an accused's defense or
was essential to a fair trial, the privilege had to yield. The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that no set rule regarding an informer's privilege was
justifiable. What was instead required was a "balancing [of] the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's
right to prepare his defense,"1 4 necessitating a case by case determina-
tion which would take into account all relevant factors.
It is apparent that there is a parallel between the informer's privilege
and the journalist's source privilege. The difference lies in the public
policy factors involved. In the former, the privilege helps to protect
Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 18, 43 (1969). Both authors, who are members of the Massa-
chusetts bar, conducted a survey of editors of daily newspapers throughout the United
States to ascertain how much the press relied on confidential sources.
140 Investigations of Publication of Select Comm. on Intelligence Report: Hearings
before the Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct Pursuant to H.R. 1042, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 723 (affadavit of Robert S. Dudney). Mr. Dudney concluded that requiring
disclosure of anonymous sources would "result almost certainly . .. (in] the disappearance
of investigative reporting about matters of extreme public interest as we know it today."
Id.
141 See note 133 supra.
142 NEWSWEEI Jan. 15, 1973, at 47.
143 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
144 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
145 Id. at 60.
116 Id. at 62. See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (use of informants in
drug law violations was vital).
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society against crime, while in the latter the privilege involves the public
interest in the free flow of news. Yet, the pre-eminence that the first
amendment has held in American law would seem to indicate a much
stronger support for the public interest in the free flow of news. The
right to a free press has always been characterized as fundamental to the
carrying out of the constitutional design. 4 7 The press has played the role
of societal watch-dog, keeping the government in check. 4 , Conse-
quently, the policies which mitigate against a journalistic privilege should
not be regarded as paramount.
A set of four conditions necessary to the establishment of a testimonial
privilege have been formulated: the information must be related in con-
fidence with the understanding that it will remain undisclosed, the ele-
ment of confidentiality must be an essential part of the relationship
between the communicant and the confidant, the relationship must be one
which the community has an interest in fostering, and the injury to the
relationship which would result from disclosure must outweigh the
benefit which is gained for the correct disposition of the litigation.
49
The journalist's privilege certainly fits this pattern. The crux of the
relationship between the reporter and the source is the understanding
that the source will not be disclosed. The community has an interest in
the preservation of the relationship because it adds to the store of infor-
mation disseminated. The fourth condition involves a balancing test for
which there is no conclusive answer, but the argument can be, and has
been made that the public detriment resulting from forced disclosure
exceeds that resulting from non-disclosure.1
50
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FuTuRE
As demonstrated above, the approach which has been taken by some
courts51 toward the question of journalists' privilege is both unrealistic
and unreasonable. The courts must recognize that the constitutional
system does confer a fundamental role upon the press, and that the judi-
ciary must be as helpful as it can in aiding the press in carrying out that
role. The courts must also recognize the professional ethics of journalism,
"I See, e.g., Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
148 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); In re Taylor, 412 Pa.
32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (the right to speak
and publish did not carry with it an unlimited right to collect information).
149 8 J. WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
150 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th CONG., 2d SESS., THE
NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE 15 (Comm. Print 1966). The report indicated that Wigmore's four
criteria are not met: the informant's identity is confidential whereas both parties are usually
known; the communicated information is disclosed whereas it usually remains confiden-
tial; the privilege belongs to the journalist and only he may waive it, whereas the privilege
is usually that of the communicant; and the journalist may assert the privilege in connection
with any information received by him whether confidential or not, whereas the usual
privilege inures only to confidential information.
... Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court completely abrogated the
existence of a privilege for non-disclosure of a source by journalists, albeit it was limited
to cases involving grand jury testimony. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
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and accept those ethics whenever possible. This means that before
subpoenas are issued, negotiation should be attempted with the journalist
involved, and an honest effort made to reach a compromise.
The press must recognize that it walks a precarious line, especially
with respect to pre-trial publicity. The rights of the defendant must be
considered, which will often require the journalist to make value judg-
ments as to what to publish or broadcast and what to withhold. In some
cases the journalist will have to choose the side of restraint. It is also
obvious that no reasonable request for information should be denied.
Much litigation and animosity could be avoided if the courts and the media
could reach accommodation through negotiation.
Total reliance should not be placed on shield laws, for their consti-
tutionality is open to question. Where they exist, however, the courts
should respect the obvious intent of the legislation and allow compulsion
only in extreme and unusual circumstances. In any case, a journalist
should be subpoenaed only as a last resort, and every means of gathering
the information required should first be exhausted no matter how bur-
densome.
A federal shield law would do much to alleviate the problems inherent
in a privilege for journalists. Such a statute should confer upon news-
persons the right to keep their sources and information confidential.
This right must be qualified, however, so that in exceptional circum-
stances it must yield, particularly when a defendant would be denied the
right to a fair trial. When the exception does arise, the burden of prov-
ing the need for the information should rest with the party urging the
abrogation of the privilege. If the court determines that the information
is essential, the journalist should be permitted to disclose it in camera
before the court.
No statute will solve all the problems, but an established set of rules,
both procedural and substantive, will at least permit reporters generally
to ascertain in advance the full ramifications of refusal to disclose confi-
dential sources.
SUSAN L. DOLIN
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